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“If we want to succeed we must rely on trust”1 
 
Mohammad Yunus  
 
 “Trust can be induced by trustworthiness and  
trustworthiness can be induced by trust” 
       
                            John Elster  
1. Introduction.  
In many underdeveloped areas, rural villages in Asia or Africa as well 
as poor and segregated neighbourhoods in western cities, micro-credit 
initiatives have revealed to be an efficient instrument to overcome the 
credit-rationing problem and to promote social, economic and human 
flourishing of the most vulnerable class of economic actors, the “poorest 
of the poor”. The success of many of these programs is difficult to 
account for in the traditional economic framework, where, because of 
the assumption of self-interested behaviour, credit rationing is predicted 
(i.e. credit is provided only to those able to back it with collaterals). 
Therefore, a potential explanation of the success of micro-credit 
initiatives have to rely on elements other than the balance between risk 
and collaterals, perspective gains and rate of repayment, or any other 
merely self-interested motives. In the paper I shall focus, in particular, on 
the role of interpersonal trust that grounds the fiduciary bond between 
borrower and lender and helps in overcoming the informational 
asymmetries that usually determine the under-provision of credit.  
 
The case of Grameen Bank will constitute the paradigm within which 
our discussion will develop. In this context, the main empirical 
phenomenon I want to shed light on is the surprisingly high rate of 
repayment experienced by the Grameen Bank, as well as by many other 
similar micro-finance institutions. A high rate of repayment is associated 
with benefits both for the lender that for the borrower and it is a 
prerequisite for financial sustainability. Besides, in reducing the cost of 
credit it allows more borrowers to benefit from it. The rate of repayment 
can be thus considered a measure of the success of any microfinance 
institution (Godquin, 2000).  
                                                 
1 Quotations from Yunus (1997) are translated from the original French into English by 
the author.  
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I present a model that account for the trustworthy behaviour of 
borrowers who, despite the temptation of opportunism, decide to repay 
the loan. In the next section (2) I shall describe the basic elements of a 
micro-credit program, using the example of Grameen Bank . Such a 
typology will be schematically compared with the traditional practices (3). 
Several theories that aim to account for the Grameen’s performance will 
be introduced and analysed (4). I shall propose an alternative explanation 
based essentially on the concept of trust responsiveness (5) that will be 
formalised into a psychological game-theoretical model (6-9). Three well-
known psychological effects consistent with the model and that 
contribute to explain borrowers’ trustworthiness will be analysed (10). In 
the end some implications for policy and institutional design are drawn 
(12). Conclusions close the paper (13) .  
2. A Bank for the “untouchables”. 
Bangladesh is one of the poorest country in the world. Most of its 
population lives in conditions of great poverty. The 40% cannot satisfy 
even the most basic daily needs. The life expectancy does not reach 40 
years. Famines are endemic and regular. Especially in the rural areas of 
the country, a system of religious and traditional norms, the purdha, is in 
use, that in its most radical version, keeps women in a condition of 
submission and makes their live, isolated, miser and excluded from any 
opportunity of self-determination (Cain, Khanam and Nahar, 1979; 
Islam, Begum, 1984). In the rural villages, in houses built with mud 
bricks and a plate roof, live large families that derive their support from 
casual works and that quite often are slave of usury. In this context to 
end up in the usurers’ hands is extremely easy for people that have no 
access to any other kind of credit. Yunus (1997) notices that, in 
Bangladesh’s rural areas, the principal cause of poverty is the 
impossibility to break the poverty vicious circle.  
One of the possibilities open to them, to break the perverse circle of 
destitution is to set up productive initiatives. However most of the time 
such a possibility is precluded because of the impossibility of access to 
formal credit opportunities at market rates. Quite often ridiculously small 
amount of money (less than a hundred dollars) would be sufficient to set 
the villagers free from the chains of poverty, but the rules governing the 
formal credit sector make it impossible and peasants, their wives, their 
sons, end up working up to 10 hours a day, only to repay the interests of 
the usurers’ debts, that often are around 10% per month. 
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To contrast such a modus operandi and its perverse consequences, in 
the 1976, economist Muhammad Yunus established the Grameen Bank 
(rural bank). Its explicit aim was to provide access to credit for the 
“poorest of the poor” and help them to escape the poverty trap.  
A fundamental requirement to enter the micro-credit program is that 
the applicants form a group of at least five people, who after an 
instructional period during which they will learn the modalities of 
functioning of the program, each will get an individual credit of which 
they will be jointly responsible. The average amount of the loans is about 
100$, repayable in one year by weekly instalments. To formalise the 
agreement, the members of the group commit themselves to the respect 
of sixteen rules; among those are especially important the commitment 
to provide to the members of their families a formal instruction, to 
vegetable planting, to better the hygienic standard of their houses with 
the installation of sanitary latrines, and to avoid giving or receiving 
dowries (Hossain, 1993).  
Every week, the group meet to pay the interests to the bank 
representative and to discuss the state of their projects, eventual requests 
and suggestions for the members’ economic activities. Those weekly 
meetings represent for many of the members (especially for women) the 
only occasion for socialisation they have in their daily life. 
Since 1976, Grameen has provided through its programs credit to 
more that 2 millions people in Bangladesh, 94% of whom are women 
and it has opened 1.128 branches that serve a total of 38.951 villages. 
The Grameen prototype has been replicated 223 times, in 58 different 
countries. Up to the 1996 Grameen has provided credit to 12 millions 
clients around the world. Half of them has succeeded in getting over the 
threshold of destitution2.  
 
The case of Grameen Bank attracted the attention not only of 
development economists, but also of others more interested in the social, 
organisational and financial aspects of the isuue (Holcombe, 1995; Jain, 
1996; Yaron, 1994, Bardhan et al., 1999, Larance, 2001). One of the 
elements that strikes more economists’ imagination, probably because 
more at odd with the profession’s wisdom and the standard credit 
system practices, the extremely high, about 94%, rate of repayments 
                                                 
2 Further information and statistical data can be obtained from the Bank’s official website 
at www.grameen-info.org. 
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experienced by Grameen3, despite they do not require baking the loan 
with collaterals.  
 
Some independent studies noticed that a re-examinations of the 
balances show the effective rate of repayment being lower than that 
declared (92,2%) (Murdoch 1999a), others, that the Bank was able to 
survive and develop only because of the constant stream of aids and 
donations and that the profits are principally due to the negative cost of 
credits4. If we consider that, although operating in the market, the main 
aim of the bank is not to distribute profits to its shareholders, but to help 
the poor to overcome their poverty problems, such a scaling down of 
the financial performance do not significantly affect the paradoxical 
nature of the phenomenon.  
In next section the credit problem will be re-framed in game-
theoretical terms in order to isolate the main factors that justify the 
different patterns of behaviour and consequent practices.  
3. Asymmetric information, opportunism and the traditional 
solution.  
 Consider a simple case of a would-be borrower that applies for a 
loan. Let’s describe formally the relationship between the Borrower (B) 
and the Lender (L). This can be done using the extensive-form known as 
the “Simple Trust Game” (figure 1).  
In this game L can decide whether to Give (G) or not (NG) the loan. 
If L chooses to give it, the decision passes to B, who in turn, have to 
decide whether to repay it (R) or opportunistically, keep the money (K). 
Suppose B receives a loan of f$; such a credit helps her in starting an 
activity which, at the end of the year, will produce profits for x$. At this 
                                                 
3 Other Microfinance Institutions obtain similar results: PRIDE Africa, which has 
extended more than 60,000 loans of between $50 and $1000 in East Africa, reports 
repayment rates of 99% in Tanzania and 100% in Uganda. The Kenya Rural Enterprise 
Program (KREP), which had lent to over 12,000 borrowers by the end of 1996, 
consistently reports repayment rates of higher than 95%. ACCION International (based 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, but operating in Latin America) reports similar figures. The 
Union Regional de Apoyo Campesino (operating in Mexico), which requires that 
borrowers maintain a savings account balance equal to at least 20% of their outstanding 
loan, reports repayment rates of 95% (see Jaffer, 1999). 
 
4 See the review by Morduch (1999b) and references therein. 
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point the choice, for B, is between repay the debt and keep the profits 
(x$) or keep the loan and the profits (e=f+x). 
In order to decide whether to give (G) her the money, the lender 
want to know the probability that the loan will be repaid. However, since 
this situation is characterised by informational asymmetries, this factor 
will be opaque to the lender. If the agents’ incentive structure is ordinally 
similar to those described in the payoff matrix of the trust game, then 
rational choice theory would prescribe to B to keep all the money. 
Anticipating that, by backward induction, an equally rational L will 
decide not to give the money.  
 
Figure 1. “ The Simple Trust Game”   
    Lender 
 
  
            NG            G     
     
   
        Borrower 
 
           K            R   
        
                
      
  a           b       c 
  d            e       f 
 
c>a>b ; e>f ; 
 
Because of the risk of opportunism, and the impossibility of credibly 
commit themselves, two rational players, a borrower and a lender, end 
up with an inefficient outcome (a,d). This conclusion will be 
strengthened if we consider that informational problems may refers, not 
only to borrowers’ behaviour (moral hazard), but also to their 
characteristics (adverse selection) and more in general to all the future 
states of the world.  
The traditional solution to this inefficiency, is based on a redefinition 
of the agent’s incentives structure aimed at reducing the advantage that B 
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would get from an opportunistic behaviour. Such a redefinition is 
generally obtained by requiring the loan being backed with collaterals, 
asking the borrower , for example, to provide a good that, in case of 
default, will immediately become bank’s property. Such a new situation 
can be described with the game of figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. “ The Banking Game”         
  Lender 
 
  
            NG            G     
     
   
        Borrower 
 
           K            R   
        
                
      
  a           b       c 
  d           e-S       f 
 
c>a>b ; e>f ; S>0 
 
The requirement of collaterals is logically equivalent to the imposition 
of a sanction for breaching the agreement. If this sort of sanction S can 
be imposed and efficiently enforced, players’ incentive structure, and 
therefore their predicted behaviour will change. In other words, the 
introduction of the sanction S, alters the equilibrium outcome. Suppose 
π (0<π<1) is the probability of default or, which is logically equivalent, 
the probability of the sanction actually being imposed; B’s payoff in case 
of opportunism will be e-πS. In this second case, therefore, the strategy 
pair (G,R) will be an equilibrium only if the condition S>(e-f)/π is met.  
With the introduction of the baking practice, the lender problem, 
could, in theory, be resolved. This solution however implies that only 
those people that are able to provide collaterals would have access to the 
formal credit system; the others will be excluded from any form of credit 
(apart from usury). This standard solution, while on the one side protects 
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the lender from the risk of insolvency, on the other tends to exclude a 
whole class of subjects from entering into the formal credit system. The 
negative consequences of this practice are more evident in the less 
developed countries where the class of excluded is larger. In these 
economies, thus, the only available alternative becomes usury, which, 
however, in the medium-run, do nothing but worsen the situation.  
In this context and within this theoretical framework the success, in 
term of repayment rate, of a financial institution such as the Grameen 
Bank, appears to be paradoxical. Precisely where the risk of insolvency 
seems to be higher the bank builds with the would-be borrower a 
relationship based on trust and not, as usually happens, on the 
assumption of opportunism. And, what is most striking, once entered 
the program the borrowers fulfil this trust to an extend which is 
surprising even for a traditional bank. How to explain this degree of 
trustworthiness? 
4. Alternative explanations. 
Many different classes of explanations have been advanced for the 
microfinance programs’ startling success.  
 One important factor that may affect borrowers’ behaviour, which is 
now at the centre of a well-established literature (Dasgupta, 1988, and 
relevant references), is the idea of repetition and the related reputation. 
The prospect that the lender and the borrower have to continue, with 
some probability, to interact in the future modify drastically the way they 
will behave. “Poor works up to twelve hours a day; to survive they have 
to sell their products. There is no reason why  they should not repay  the 
debt, especially if they want ask for another one, that help them survive one 
more day” (Yunus, 1997:76, italic added). As David Hume noticed 
centuries ago - “There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our 
reputation, and nothing which our reputation more depends than our 
conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every 
one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good 
terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any 
temptation, to be induct to violate those principles” (1740:501).  
 Suppose that a borrower, while the first loan has still to be repaid, 
decides to apply for a second one and perhaps a third one, and so on, for 
any finite or indefinite number of times5. Given such repeated decisions, 
                                                 
5 In general for this result to hold, is necessary that the repetition occurs for an infinite 
number of times. For, if the number is large but finite, the same backward induction, that 
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the payoff matrix of the Simple Trust Game should be amended in order 
to incorporate the entire sequence of payoffs that the players may get in 
the future rounds. It is possible to show that, given a certain probability 
that the next round will not be the last, and given a certain discount 
factor, there exist rational strategies that sustain the cooperative outcome 
(G,R), even in situations like the Simple Trust Game (Kreps, 1990). 
Suppose that a borrower at a certain moment decides not to repay 
her debt. This will immediately prevent her from getting credit in the 
future rounds. If the loss deriving from not having access to future 
credits is bigger than the gain from the present opportunistic behaviour, 
then, it would be rational for the borrower to repay her debt. This 
situation is logically equivalent to that considered in the Banking Game 
of figure 2, where the loss future opportunities is equal to the sanction S.  
 
A second class of explanations refers to the fact that successful 
micro-credit programs rely heavily on pre-existing social norms, culture, 
religion, and other “social collaterals” to provide the incentives that 
would usually be provided by traditional collaterals (Johnson and Rogaly, 
1997).  
Yet another explanation stresses the fact that micro-credit programs 
contribute fostering a “credit-conducive culture”, insisting, for example, 
on the attendance at weekly meetings and other occasions that help 
disseminating information about people’s reputation (Pankaj, 1996). 
Social ties and homogeneity among members facilitate the working of 
social incentive thus affecting the rate of repayment (Besley and Coates, 
1995).   
A third explanation emphasises the importance of “solidarity 
lending”. In the majority of the micro-credit programs, the borrowers are 
required to form group bound by joint liability. In case of default by one 
of the member the others would cover the shortfall. The existence of the 
group of debtors offers to its members psychological and social  
incentives, to repay their the loan. The weekly meetings among members 
and the bank’s representative, favour in the members the development 
of a strong feeling of identification with the institution. Such a process 
leads presumably, to a change in subjects’ preferences in the sense of a 
reduction of the temptation of opportunistic behaviours.  Such an 
                                                                                                         
makes a player stop in the trust game, applies. In particular case, however, using the 
techniques developed by Kreps and Wilson (1982) it is possible to show that, given certain 
assumptions, a cooperative behaviour is sustainable for a large number of rounds even 
though the repetition occurs for a finite (but large) number of times.  
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explanation can be further qualified. An additional reason why the 
existence of the group provides incentives to the repayment of the debt, 
is the risk of social ostracism that the opportunist incur. Such an 
ostracism would manifest in term of an exclusion from all the village’s 
social activities6. The micro-credit institutions spring in a “missing 
market” and help solving, through the group-lending mechanism, the 
problem of moral hazard (Stiglitz 1990) and adverse selection (Gatack, 
1999) that can affect such kind of situations, so that, the bank 
experiences a reduction in the costs for screening, monitoring and 
enforcing the (informal) agreements. At the same time, also the 
transaction and administrative costs are reduced. Such elements, together 
with “extraordinary repayment rates – lead to the conclusion that - 
“group liability is a better guarantee of financial responsibility than 
property" (Devereux and Pares, 1990:23; see also Jaffer, 1999).  
 
Figure 3. “The Simple Trust Game with monetary sanction and social 
sentiments”       
  Lender 
 
  
            NG            G     
     
   
        Borrower 
 
           K            R   
        
  1-p      p        
      
  a           b       c 
  d       e-S-αW     f+βW 
 
c>a>b ; e>f ; S>0; W>0; 0<α<1; 0<β<1 
                                                 
6 Among the recent studies that formalise the process of social enforcement, see Stiglitz 
(1990), Varian (1990), Prescott (1997) and Conning (1997).  
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All these explicative strategies can be summarised in the game of 
figure 3,  where beside the monetary sanction a social element, social 
pressure, others’ approval or disapproval and ostracism, is added. While 
monetary sanctions apply only to breach of trust, social approval rewards 
trustworthy moves and social disapproval penalises opportunistic 
behaviour.  
Here W represents the objective value of social approbation and 
disapprobation7 (its monetary value) which enters B’s payoff weighted by 
a parameter α which captures B’s subjective sensitivity to generic others’ 
disapprobation and by a parameter β, which conversely, captures B’s 
subjective sensitivity to generic others’ approbation.  
Approbation and disapprobation, in this simplified framework, are 
triggered by transgressing or conforming to a well-established social 
norm which in this case is assumed to be “not consciously breach others’ 
trust”. In this case (G,R) represents the equilibrium outcome only if   
W>(e-S-f)/ π (α+β). 
 
All the explanations I have described so far help to understand the 
role played by different important factors that may be involved in the 
phenomenon at issue. However, apart from the difficulty to explain one-
shot situations, where repetition is not involved, such accounts leave 
aside some other important elements, that are perceived to be crucial 
even by many of the participants in the project. Yunus, for instance, 
stresses in particular two aspects: 
A) “If we want succeed we must rely on trust” (1997:197);  
B) “the poor have their self-love” (1997: 34).  
The idea behind the establishment of the Grameen Bank, and of many 
other similar initiatives, is precisely to set up a bank that does not 
operate according the schema of the “Banking Game”, but according to 
the rules of the “Simple Trust Game”. Such a shift is justified once the 
anthropological assumption of material self-interested behaviour is 
relaxed. Yunus himself emphasises this point: “Nowadays, banks tend to 
suspect every borrower of wanting to run with the money (…) for 
Grameen, on the contrary, the starting point is that the borrowers are 
                                                 
7 For convenience I assume that the value of social approbation and disapprobation is 
equal. Relaxing this assumption would not alter the conclusions of the argument. 
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honest. We can be seen as naive, nevertheless, in the 94% of the cases, 
our trust has been repaid” (1997:108).  
Trust and self-esteem are tightly intertwined concepts; in the rest of 
the paper their role in the explanation of micro-credit success will be 
formally explored.  
5. Trust responsiveness. 
That trust among agents is important even for market transactions is 
popular wisdom. According to John Stuart Mill: “the advantage of 
humankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every 
crevice and cranny of human life: the economical is perhaps the smallest 
part of it, yet even this is incalculable” (Mill, 1848:131).  
Trust has been variously defined as a personality trait (Deutsch 1973; 
Jones 1986; Backer 1987), or as an eminently probabilistic phenomenon (Baier 
1986, 1994; Gambetta 1988; Luhman 1979, 2000), or as a matter of 
encapsulated interest (Hardin 1993, 2001). Among all those conceptions, 
however, the characterisation that best seems to account for the primary 
quality, the essential features of the trust phenomenon, is the idea of 
trust as a responsive behaviour (Horsburgh 1960; Granovetter, 1985; Jussim 
1986; Pettit 1995; Pelligra 2005a).  
The main feature of the responsive conception of trust refers to the 
fact that trust is basically a matter of interpersonal relationship and that 
the relational factor should play a central part in its understanding. An 
act of trust takes place within a (often personalised) relation between two 
subjects. It is extremely unlikely that a theory that considers the reasons 
to behave trustfully and trustworthily as external to the relationship 
would be able to give a satisfactory account of what trust is. That means 
that, at a given node of the interaction, whether or not alter decides to 
behave trustworthily does not depend on which behaviour ego has 
performed in the previous nodes. On the contrary, a more satisfactory 
theory of trust should be able to account for the influences alter’s 
observed choices exert on ego’s preferences and choices. In the trust 
responsiveness hypothesis, a trusting move induces trustworthiness 
through an endogenous modification of ego’s preferences structure. A 
single act of genuine trust may provide additional reasons to behave 
trustworthily. That is the basic idea beyond the “trust responsiveness 
hypothesis”.  
 In the context considered by this paper to behave “trustfully”, 
means, for an agent (say L, the lender) to select choices, in particular 
dynamic situations, based on the expectation that the other agent (say B, 
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the borrower)8 will not behave opportunistically, that is, do not exploit 
the situation to select choices that are, at the same time, advantageous 
for her and detrimental for L. The later behaviour is said “trustworthy”. 
 More formally, a strategy is trustful when: 
1) in situations like the Trust Game; 
2) the L player plays G; 
In the same way B’s behaviour is said trustworthy, when: 
conditions 1 and 2 are meet, and  
3) The B player plays R.  
 
Assume two subjects, L and B; when L behaves trustfully she overtly 
manifests her expectations about B’s behaviour. The idea of trust 
responsiveness assumes that such manifestation induces in B a tendency 
to fulfil A’s expectations even at some material cost. In this respect trust 
is said to be self-fulfilling. I suggest that this mechanism could be a 
major factor in explaining the high rate of repayment experienced by 
most of micro-credit programs.  
Pelligra (2005a) extendedly discusses the basic elements of the trust 
responsiveness  hypothesis which, moreover, has recently obtained 
strong empirical support by experimental studies (Gneezy and 
Dufwenmberg, 2000; Bacharach, Guerra and Zizzo, 2001; Pelligra 2005b).  
Trust responsiveness postulates that people is responsive to others’ 
expectations and intentions. To account for this kind of effect agents have 
to be endowed with an enlarged concept of rationality where self-interest is 
no longer the only source of motivation. Besides it, in fact, it is assumed, 
that people have a desire (aversion) both for praise (blame) and  
praiseworthiness (blameworthiness). The origin of this motivational 
structure can be traced back to Adam Smith (1759/1976): 
 
Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or 
to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He 
naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be 
that thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred. He 
desires, not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or to be that thing 
which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the 
natural and proper object of praise. He dreads, not only blame, 
                                                 
8 For the sake of simplicity, I am considering here only dyadic interactions. The logic of 
the argument and its conclusions do not vary when applied to more than two players.   
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but blame worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should 
be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object 
of blame. (III.2.1) 
 
Given these anthropological assumptions about what motives agents’ 
actions is possible schematically summarise how trust responsiveness 
works. Suppose there are two players L (Lender) and B (Borrower). L 
moves first and B observes L’s choice;  
1.    B is interested in what L thinks of him. 
2. If such an opinion is a good (bad) one, B experiences an increase 
(decrease ) in utility; 
3. If L trusts (behaves trustfully towards) B, she is signalling a good 
opinion of B. She implicitly expects a non-opportunistic behaviour 
from B. 
4. If B responds in a way that confirms (disconfirms) her belief, B’s 
psychological utility will increase (decrease)9. 
5. The same is true of L, when her trust is repaid (increase) or 
frustrated (decrease). 
6. Such a psychological gain or loss has to be weighted with the 
material gain or loss.  
7. L knows that B wants to increase his utility. 
8. L anticipates that, if the material loss is not too large, such an 
increase in utility will come from a trustworthy behaviour 
9. All those points are common knowledge. 
6. Strategies as a Signal of Expectations. 
As we have already said, the idea of trust responsiveness refers to a 
particular sort of subjective reaction that can be elicited by the 
expression of an expectation of trustworthiness. In situations like those 
described by the Trust Game, such an expectation is signalled by the 
choice of a trustful strategy (G), and specifically by the trustor’s 
                                                 
9 Barr and Kinsey (2002) provide experimental data suggesting that this is true especially 
for women. A similar result empirically supports the gender bias present in most micro-
credit programs. In particular the experiment show that: 1) within the context of the 
public goods game, men are less regarding of others when deciding how to behave, 2) 
that they show signs of being less pro-social than their female co-villagers and 3) that 
men are less effective than women at sanctioning others. 
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conscious acceptance of the risk implied by that choice. Trust 
responsiveness assumes that B has a preference to fulfil L’s expectations 
when these express a good opinion of him, even though in so doing L 
incurs some material cost. Consistently with Smith’s argument, the basic 
assumption of this model is that people are sensitive to social emotions, 
that is those emotions that depend on expectations about strategic 
behaviour. While social approval is captured by the exogenous parameter 
W, social emotions are produced endogenously through a process of 
psychological forward induction. 
Suppose a Lender (L) and a Borrower (B) interact in a “Simple Trust 
Game”. L moves first and B observes her choice. It is common 
knowledge that both L and B prefer more material wealth than less. 
Suppose that out-of equilibrium moves are allowed and that such moves 
are “rationalised”, that is, not interpreted by the observer (the player that 
has not done the move) as errors. Suppose that, having observed L’s 
choice the observer (B, in this case) engages in a process that allows him 
to revise his belief according to the fact that a trustful or a mistrustful 
strategy signals different expectations and that such expectations elicit in 
B a confirming response.  
Suppose that B observed a trustful choice (L plays G). How can 
such an observation be rationalised? How can such a choice be made 
consistent with an (expanded) notion of rationality? When B observes L 
playing G, if he rules out mistakes, or mere masochism, L’s behaviour 
can be consistent with her expectation of B’s trustworthy response. 
From observing a trustful behaviour, B may extract a signal that 
expresses to him L's expectation about his choice. Suppose B gets the 
signal correctly. Now he is aware of L’s expectations. In deciding what to 
do, B takes into account not only the material consequences of his 
action, but also the internal and the external reasons for action, her 
desire of praise and her desire of praiseworthiness. 
These derive respectively from B’s anticipation of L’s reaction to his 
choice and from B’s own self-evaluation of his own choice. L’s reaction, 
and consequently its effects on B’s psychological utility will be positive if 
B’s choice fulfils L’s expectation, it will be negative in the case of 
divergence between expectations and action. It is plausible to assume 
that in this case the external effect has the same sign as the internal 
effect, because even from an impartial standpoint, the perspective from  
which the subject sees his own actions, trustworthiness is praiseworthy 
while opportunism is blameworthy. Put in another way, by being 
trustworthy B will gain psychological utility for external reasons, because 
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he experiences L’s “confirmed” good opinion, and also for internal 
reasons, because the trustworthy choice will increase his own sense  of 
worth.  
Given these considerations, B’s choice will come out of the net 
balance between the material gain and the psychological loss (in the case 
of opportunistic behaviour) or between a material loss and a 
psychological gain (in the case of a trustworthy behaviour). The idea of 
trust responsiveness implies that B’s psychological utility increases by 
responding positively to A’s trustful expectations and decreases by 
frustrating such an expectation.  
7. Motivational structure. 
To keep things simple, in the following example I shall focus only on 
the formalisation of players’ internal and external reasons, that is, thair 
desire for praiseworthiness and for praise, leaving aside other elements 
like monetary sanctions and social pressure. Yet another assumption is 
that these internal and external reasons have the same sign; that means 
that others’ approbation and disapprobation are consistent with 
individual’s own self-evaluation. The rationale for this assumption is that 
trustworthiness and opportunism give rise to the same sort of negative 
and positive judgement both socially and individually. Another crucial 
assumption of the model is that the emotions triggered by L’s perceived 
or anticipated reaction to B’s choice are proportional to L’s degree of 
belief about that choice. In other words, in case of opportunism, L’s 
frustration and consequently B’s guilt, will be proportional to L’s 
expectation of trustworthiness. The converse is true for pride. B’s pride 
will be positively dependent from L’s expectation of opportunism. I 
assume also that positive and negative emotions, pride for 
trustworthiness and guilt for opportunism, are symmetric. Given all 
these assumptions, we may formalise both internal and external reasons 
with a single psychological factor. 
B’s extended payoff, therefore, comes out of his objective payoff, say 
the amount of money, plus a psychological factor. In choosing his 
action, B seeks to maximise the sum of material and psychological utility.  
8. A model of psychological forward induction. 
Such a motivational structure can be formalised for a class of games 
with the structure of the Simple Trust Game using psychological game 
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theory10. Consider now the variant of the Simple Trust Game depicted in 
figure 4.  
Figure 4. “The Simple Trust Game with Sentiments” 
 
     Lender 
 
  
            NG            G     
     
  
        Borrower 
 
           K            R   
        
  1-p      p        
      
  a           b       c 
  d                e-Gr               f 
 
 
c>a>b ; e>f ; G>0;  
 
Denote with p ∈ [0,1] the probability that B plays R; 1-p is the 
probability with which B plays K. In the same way q ∈ [0,1]  represents 
L’s belief about p11. Analogously, r denotes B’s belief about q, that is, B’s 
belief about L’s beliefs about B’s choice. In this way we describe B’s 
hierarchy of beliefs, in particular, his first and second order beliefs. These 
beliefs are crucial to transform the standard game into a psychological 
one. I restrict my formal discussion to the usual equilibrium analysis 
leaving aside considerations of out-of-equilibrium behaviour.  
Suppose B observes L’s trustful choice; we are now in the second 
node of the game, where B has to move. In this version of the trust 
                                                 
10 See Huang and Wu (1994), Ruffle (1999) and Dufwenberg (2002) for similar 
applications.  
11 L’s belief can be though of as the mean of B’s subjective distribution over the 
probability p.   
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game B’s payoff from being opportunist is formed by the material part 
and the psychological one which in turn depends on B’s guilt.  
The negative impact of guilt on B’s overall utility is a multiple G 
(G>0) of L’s expectation r. The intuition underlying such a formalisation 
is that B suffers a psychological loss when he deliberately lets L down 
knowing that L has trusted him, and such a loss is proportional to B’s 
belief about L’s expectation of B’s trustworthy behaviour.  
9. Trustful and trustworthy equilibria. 
Following Geneakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) we can solve 
the game by isolating its psychological equilibria. In a psychological 
equilibrium players maximise their utility, and their first and second 
order believes are confirmed (p=q=r). This particular game shows three 
of such equilibria. In the first, L expects B to play trustworthily; given 
this  expectation, B’s psychological cost deriving from frustrating it 
becomes strong enough to lead B to the expected choice. L knows that 
and sets q accordingly (q=1): she plays G; B knows that as well, and sets 
r=q=1: he plays R. In the first equilibrium L plays G and p=q=r=1, that 
is, B plays R. This represents a trustful and trustworthy pure strategy 
equilibrium. Here, in fact, L’s expectation about B’s trustworthiness 
justifies L’s trustful choice and such a choice strengthens B’s reasons 
(avoiding psychological costs) to behave accordingly to what L expected. 
Trust is self-fulfilling. 
In the second equilibrium, L expects B playing opportunistically, 
that choice would not produce any psychological cost for B. L knows 
that and sets q=0; consequently B sets r=q=0. In the second equilibrium 
L plays NG and p=q=r=0, that is, B plays K.   
The third (mixed-strategy) equilibrium is obtained by setting B’s 
payoff from opportunism and from trustworthiness equal, and imposing 
p=r. In this third equilibrium, which only exists if 
 pc+(1-p)b>a              (1) 
 
that means that L plays G provided that  
 
p=q=r=(e-f)/G                           (2) 
 
and  
    0<(e-f)/G<1                                      (3) 
 
the associated payoffs are  
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for L:  pc+(1-p)b 
for B:   (1-p)(e -rG)+pf 
 
In this third case both trustworthiness and opportunism may follow 
L’s trustful move, depending on players’ beliefs. The denominator G in 
(2) represents the impact of social sentiments, or internal reasons, on B’s 
utility. This factor as well as the difference (e-f) directly affects the 
probability of B’s trustworthy behaviour.  
 The model is consistent both with (pure) trustful and trustworthy 
equilibrium and with (pure) mistrustful and opportunistic equilibrium. 
There is also a third mixed-strategy equilibrium that shows how the 
likelihood of the different outcome depends on  subjective elements. 
The Simple Trust Game when analysed as a psychological game becomes 
a coordination game12. Which equilibrium will e selected depends, in fact, 
by the way players coordinate their first and second order expectations. 
It is natural than that the next step in the description of the fiduciary 
basis of this class of interactions would be the analysis of some of the 
elements that contribute to solve this coordination problem. 
10. Fiduciary dynamics. 
Trust responsiveness is based on the perception of the idea that the 
others have of us and on its direct and indirect influence on our self-
esteem. Such a perception develops and strengths in relation to others’ 
actions, and particularly in relation to our interpretation of such actions. 
Such interpretation, in turn, is strongly affected by the context and the 
framework within which actions take place. In strategic environments 
people’s behaviour is heavily influenced by the way they frame the 
situations they are in, that is, by what kind of norm they think would be 
appropriate to follow in a specific situation. The so-called framing effect 
precisely describes how the same action may provoke different reactions 
depending on the context where it happens.  
Ross and Ward (1996) and Blair and Stout (2000) report of 
experiments where subjects’ behaviour in exactly the same situation, is 
modified by non-theoretically relevant elements, as, for instance, the 
mere semantic description of the situation itself. In a social dilemma, 
labelled as “community game”, the number of cooperative choices turns 
out to be much larger that in the same game when labelled as “wall street 
game”. The framing of the situation in this context, as well as pre-play 
                                                 
12 Camerer and Thaler (2003) provide a similar interpretation.  
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communication in others, helps players in coordinating their first and 
second order beliefs. Is the framing of the situation that alters players’ 
belief about others’ expected behaviour and about their expectations on 
each other’s behaviour.  
The fact that the model exhibits multiple equilibria may be 
interpreted as giving rise to problems of indeterminacy. On the contrary, 
it constitutes an element of realism, in particular because it leaves room 
to the working of such a framing-effect as beliefs’ correlating device. A 
further point is important to notice: the degree of indeterminacy in a 
sequential trust game is much less determinant than in a, for example, 
simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the trust game the coordination of 
players’ beliefs is simplified by the fact that player B can observe L’s 
move and infer her belief from it. Her playing G, means reasonably that 
L expects B to play R.    
A second factor that is important to take into account in order to isolate 
those elements involved in micro-credit programs that favours the working 
of interpersonal trust is the so-called motivational crowding-out (Frey, 
1997, 2001). The crowding-out mechanism explains why, in certain cases, 
subjects’ willingness to perform a given action is decreased (increased) by 
the prospect of a material incentive (disincentive). Such an effect operates 
when the use of monetary rewards or punishments transforms the subject’s 
motivations from intrinsic to extrinsic. The reasons behind such a 
phenomenon are many13; among them, particularly relevant are those 
concerning subject’s self-determination and self-esteem.  
Imposing an external system of material incentives may produce in the 
subjects the impression of being controlled and of loosing the control of 
the situation (Rotter, 1966), so that, the locus of motivation shifts from 
internal to external. An external intervention, in the same way, may bring 
the message that subject’s individual responsibility (and therefore also the 
potential merit) is not acknowledged and that her intrinsic motivation is 
rejected. In this way,  as Frey suggests - “An intrinsically motivated person 
is denied the chance to display his or her own interest and involvement in 
an activity, when someone else offers a reward” (1997:47). As a result of an 
underestimated responsibility, the subject experiences an impairment of her 
self-esteem, that consequently, reduces her willingness to perform the given 
action. 
Furthermore, the way the subject perceives the external intervention 
plays a crucial role in determining the crowding-out or crowding-in effect. 
                                                 
13 See Frey (1997), for a complete review. 
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In fact, such an intervention can be seen either as controlling or as supporting, 
subjects’ behaviour. In the latter case, we observe a strengthening of 
subjects’ intrinsic motivations (crowding-in), in the former case, because of 
the impaired self-determination and self-esteem, we observe its weakening 
or even destroying (crowding-out).  
 A third element, that favours the activation of the trust 
responsiveness, and that, for certain aspects is related to the other two, is 
the so-called “Feeling of Freedom-Effect”.  There is a research 
program in cognitive psychology that investigates the mechanisms that 
rule a class of behaviours defined as “compliance without pressure”, that 
is, those mechanisms that determines a positive (costly) response to a 
request or to an expectation in absence of any kind of coercion (Kiesler 
1971; Joule, Gouilloux and Weber 1989; Chartrand, Pinckert and Burger, 
1999). One of the main findings is that when subjects perceive 
themselves as free to act, they are more willing to positively respond to a 
given request or expressed expectation. Consider the example of 
voluntary charitable donations. Experiments show that the level of such 
donations, as well as the sense of commitment, significantly increases 
when requests are formulated using sentences such as "it is up to you to 
see", "up to you to choose", "but you are free of…" (Guéguen and 
Pascual, 2000). The explanation of this phenomenon is related to the 
semantic characteristics of the requesting formulas. Such formulas elicit a 
sense of freedom in the potential donor and, at the same time, suggest 
that the petitioners’ are trusting her, are relying on her contribution.  It has 
been noticed that: “The verbal evocation of the freedom (…) really 
activates the feeling of freedom for the subject” (p.268). The positive 
relation between such a perception and the level of compliance has been 
investigated, obtaining support, in several studies (Kiesler 1971; Cialdini 
1993) that show how the feeling of freedom acts as “facilitator of 
commitment towards the expected behavior” (Ibid.)  
11. Why to repay the loan? 
 I have isolated and analysed some of the elements that can 
be subsumed within the logic of trust responsiveness and that may 
favour or hinder trustworthiness. The relational basis of our motivations 
suggests that the kind of responsiveness to others’ actions and beliefs 
implied by the trust responsiveness mechanism, is somehow 
symmetrical. That means that one may be motivated to be trustworthy 
by being trusted upon (trust responsiveness) but also to be opportunistic 
by being treated as a potential opportunist (distrust responsiveness). 
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Let’s try now, to explicitly apply such elements to the lender-borrower 
relation as conceived in micro-credit initiatives. To do so is necessary to 
schematically describe the principles that underlies the usual practices of 
the Lender. Consider for simplicity the case of the Grameen Bank. The 
following sentence clearly summarises Grameen’s attitude:  “Banks tend to 
suspect every clients to want take the money and run. So they bind her 
with every kind of clauses especially designed by specialised lawyers. In 
the bank system there is only diffidence (…) for Grameen, on the 
contrary, the starting point is that debtors are honest. Since our first day 
we decided that our system will not had relied on police and courts (…) 
nowadays to recover our credits we never use lawyers (…) Following the 
same logic we do not use formal contracts between clients and the bank. 
We establish relationships with people not with documents” (Yunus, 
1997:106-108).  
 In the case of the micro-credit, a trustful lenders is signalling 
to the borrowers that she believes them to be trustworthy and set her 
expectations on the basis of that belief. We have already seen how such a 
signal may motivate agents to behave trustworthily to fulfil the principal’s 
expectations. Consider now what happens when the principal behaves 
distrustfully, as in the case of the traditional credit institutions. In this case 
the bank is signalling a belief that without the external intervention 
(collaterals and monitoring) the agents would not be willing to behave 
accordingly to the nature of the relation (repay her debt). According to the 
logic of the motivational crowding-out, this signal itself would contribute to 
elicit the opportunistic behaviour.    
 Moreover, is not difficult to realise that not asking for 
collaterals, and not evoking lawyers’ interventions or other formal 
enforcement systems, favours the fact that the clients frame their 
relations with the bank as highly cooperative. Besides, such a practice 
elicits in the clients the “feeling of freedom-effect” that increases their 
willingness to fulfil the bank’s expectations. 
 It should have became clear, by now, the importance of 
trust and self-esteem. On of the pillars of Grameen’s activity is the 
awareness of that fact that - “if we want to succeed we must rely on 
trust” (Yunus, 1997:197). The intuition that has lead to the adoption of 
the fiduciary principle as ruling principle of the lender-borrower 
relationship, finds support in the existence of the mechanism of trust 
responsiveness. The roots of trust responsiveness are found in human 
beings’ desire for sociality and social approbation.  
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Such a desire implies a particular attention to the opinion of the 
others as well as our owns. Confirming a good opinion by fulfilling 
certain manifest expectations leads to an increases in utility.  
 It does not seems unjustified to claim that together with 
other factors (self-interest, reputation, social costs) the principle of trust 
responsiveness provides a contextualised interpretative tool, that can be 
useful to understand the high rate of repayment experienced by the 
Grameen Bank and other similar micro-finance institutions. 
12. The risk of a counterproductive regulation. 
 Being aware of how a mechanism like trust responsiveness 
plays a central role in increasing the efficiency of micro-credit programs, 
could be important, not only on the positive side, for the understanding 
of the phenomenon itself, but also on the normative side, for guiding the 
related activity of institutional design and policy. The effects of 
principles such as crowding-out, social framing and feeling of freedom, 
has to be carefully taken into account when designing schemes of 
interaction and legal norms that rule collective actions. Recent studies 
(Blair and Stout 2000, Pelligra 2004) show that considering such 
elements is crucial when devising and applying social norms, that even 
when operating in an highly competitive environment, the market, often 
are based on the fiduciary duty, and that are difficult to be accounted for 
only in term of economic incentives. With regard to the study and the 
design of legal rules it has been noticed that: “there is a danger in failing 
to appreciate the tremendous value to be added by incorporating the 
phenomenon of trust into legal scholarship (…) danger not only for 
academics, but for lawmakers, practising lawyers and businessfolk.(…) 
this is so because the attempts to employ external incentives can often 
reduce levels of trust and trustworthiness within the firm by eroding 
corporate participants’ internal motivations” (Blair and Stout 2000:4). If 
that is true in a highly competitive environment, it is true a fortiori for 
micro-finance programs and in general for all development programs, 
where the market pressure is often attenuated. It is easy to understand 
then, how factors like participants’ self-determination and self-esteem, as 
well as the framing of the situation as a cooperative one, are essential in 
order to reduce the risks of opportunism ingrained in such actions. It is 
now widely accepted (Sunstein, 1990; Ayres and Britwhaite, 1992; 
Grabowsky, 1995; Brennan and Pettit, 2004), that if such factors are 
neglected, it is possible to develop codes of norms that, contributing to 
the creation of a competitive framing, leads to inefficient and 
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counterproductive outcomes, that is, to a reduction in subjects’ 
willingness to behave cooperatively, as those norms would prescribe.  
 The case of Grameen constitutes, in this sense, a 
paradigmatic example showing how is possible to encourage agents to 
behave according to their fiduciary duties, not by means of pecuniary 
sanctions or incentives, but by both trusting them and attributing to the 
environment the distinctive traits of a cooperative relationship, that is 
freedom, responsibility, commitment; favouring this way the 
development of trustworthy behaviours.  
 Incidentally, it is worth noticing that, ceteris paribus, the 
institutions capable to develop trustful and trustworthy relations among 
its members, enjoy, in the long-run, a competitive advantage. That fact 
should help explaining problems of financial sustainability of micro-
credits initiatives.  
13. Conclusions. 
This paper is primarily aimed at suggesting a theoretically sound and 
empirically well grounded explanation for the high rate of loan 
repayment observed in the Grameen Bank as well as in many other micro-
finance institutions. This explanation is based on the notion of trust 
responsiveness. Since in micro-credit programs, usually loans are not 
baked with collaterals, their success in terms of repayment rate cannot be 
fully explained within traditional rational choice theory. After having 
schematically described the problem of opportunism, I have delineated 
the essential characteristics of the Grameen program. I have, then, 
discussed some of the theories that can be used to account for the 
phenomenon, recognising how such explanations are partial and, more 
importantly, tend to neglect some of the aspects that are instead 
considered crucial by the participant to the program themselves, trust 
and self-esteem. For this reason we explored and formalised in a 
psychological game theoretical model the role of trust, and in particular 
of the concept of trust responsiveness. I have discussed some of the 
factors that may positively and negatively affect its functioning. Those 
factors were used to provide an explanation of the phenomenon at issue 
and to stress the risks implied in policy and institutional design activities 
that do not take into account the fiduciary dynamics that the case of 
Grameen so clearly illustrates.  
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